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Abstract: 
This paper compares the way in which the United Kingdom and New Zealand approach 
discrimination claims on the ground of sexual orientation. This paper uses the recent 
judgment in the case of Bull v Hall as an avenue to explore this issue contrasting it with a 
similar fact situation in New Zealand, the Pilgrim Planet Lodge discrimination. This paper 
illustrates that the majority in Bull v Hall were able to take a substantive equality approach 
to their reasoning. This approach is the most consistent with the principle of non-
discrimination. The paper then focuses on the legislative and process differences in the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand and the results they produce. Finally by looking and 
the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches this paper concludes that to build a 
human rights culture and respect the principle of non-discrimination there needs to be 
more availability of pubic litigation of discrimination claims.  
 
Key words: Bull v Hall, Discrimination, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, The Human 
Rights Act, Sexual Orientation.  
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I Introduction 
The late Nelson Mandela once championed that “to deny any person their human rights is 
to challenge their very humanity.”1  The human rights debate, in particular the rights of 
non-heterosexuals, 2 has moved to the forefront of public debate in New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. The recent passage of numerous pieces of legislation has recognised the 
insidiousness of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.3  The moral compass 
has swung in favour of recognising and respecting the individuality of all people. 
Legislatures have deemed that individual expression of sexual orientation should not be a 
legitimate basis for discrimination. New Zealand and the United Kingdom have been 
resolute in their condemnation of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, there 
are however, differences between how the two jurisdictions deal with claims of 
discrimination. 
 
In this paper, I will discuss the different approaches to the resolution of discrimination 
complaints on the basis of sexual orientation. The recent judgment of the United 
Kingdom’s Supreme Court in Bull v Hall, a case of discrimination against a non-
heterosexual couple at a private hotel,4 has propelled the discrimination dispute resolution 
  
1  Nelson Mandela (Speech to Joint Meeting of the Unites States Congress 26 June 1990). 
2  Throughout this paper the term non-heterosexual is used instead of many other terms that could have 
been used for queer sexual orientations. The reasons for this are threefold. First, from a purely 
practical perspective, using ‘non-heterosexual’ and its derivatives leads to consistency of 
terminology throughout the paper. Second, I wanted to avoid the sterile nature and negative 
connotations of ‘homosexuality’ and ‘homosexual’. Third, I wanted to be inclusive in this paper. 
The issues surrounding discrimination are not just confined to gay men, they are pervasive 
throughout the queer community and I intend to be inclusive while writing this paper. I recognise 
that non-heterosexual is not a term that everyone in the community uses or identifies with, the 
confines of academic writing however, require a choice to be made. 
3  Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK); Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (UK); Civil Union Act 
2004; Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013. See also the repeal of s 28 of the 
Local Government Act 1988 (UK) in 2003, that act stated local authorities “shall not intentionally 
promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality" or 
"promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended 
family relationship". 
4  Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73 [2013] 1 WLR 3741. 
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process into the national media.5  Much has been made of the ability of the nation’s highest 
court to make a public pronouncement of the legality of particular policies. This sits in 
stark contrast to an analogous case in New Zealand, the Pilgrim Planet discrimination. This 
case concerned discrimination against a non-heterosexual couple at a Whangarei Bed and 
Breakfast.  
 
The fundamental premise of this paper is that there needs to be an increase recognition of 
non-heterosexual rights, in particular when they conflict with religious rights. In this 
respect in Part II of this paper I will discuss the judgment of Bull v Hall, in order to illustrate 
the United Kingdom’s approach. Included in this will be a brief discussion of the 
procedural history of the case and the relevant legislation. 
 
In Part III of this paper I will analyse the effectiveness of this judgment in achieving the 
aims of the principle of non-discrimination. To do this I will start with encapsulating the 
fundamental aims of the principle. I will then explore this through the lens of the judgment 
of Bull v Hall. Concluding that the majority was correct in its interpretation of the law and 
recognising the legitimacy of non-heterosexual relationships and the rights ascribed to 
them.  
 
I will then explore the difference between the two jurisdictions. In Part IV I will first 
embark on a threefold comparison. First the legislative mechanisms, through which 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is achieved will be compared. Second, 
the process of resolving disputes, contrasting the mediation of disputes in New Zealand 
and the litigation focus in the United Kingdom. Finally comparing the remedies available. 
This will provide the basis for further discussion of the Pilgrim Planet discrimination. 
 
  
5  See for example: “Bristol Gay Couple Win Cornwall B&B Bed Ban Case” BBC (online ed, London, 
18 January 2011); “Gay Couple Awarded Damages after Christian Hotel Owners Refused to Let 
Them Share Double Room” The Telegraph (online ed, London, 18 January 2011) and Steve Doughty 
and Anna Edwards “B&B Owners’ Right to Bar Gay Couple Crushed by ‘Need to Fight 
Discrimination’ Mail Online (online ed, London, 27 November 2013). 
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In Part V of this paper I will broaden the discussion to what each approach achieves. This 
will focus on the need that will be identified in Part IV, building a rights culture. I will 
compare the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. Concluding that in order to 
truly accomplish the aims of the principle of non-discrimination there needs to be a more 
open resolution of discrimination complaints. 
 
II Bull v Hall 
In order to fully illustrate the United Kingdom’s approach to discrimination, this part of 
the paper will focus on the judgment of Bull v Hall. First traversing the legislation and facts 
at issue in the case. The reasoning of the lower courts and their interpretation of the 
legislation will then be set out before moving on to the Supreme Court’s judgment. 
A The Events Leading to a Claim of Discrimination 
Mr Preddy and Mr Hall (“the Preddy-Halls”) were civil partners who lived in Bristol. In 
September 2008 they booked a weekend away at the Bull’s Chymorvah Private Hotel in 
Marazion, Cornwall. Mr and Mrs Bull, who owned the Hotel with their cousin Mr Quinn, 
were devout Christians and believed that the “only divinely ordained sexual relationship is 
that between a man and a woman within the bonds of matrimony.”6  The Bulls advertised 
their policy, of only letting double-bedded rooms to heterosexual married couples, on their 
booking website which stated: 7  
 
Here at Chymorvah we have few rules, but please note, that out of a deep regard for 
marriage we prefer to let double accommodation to heterosexual married couples only 
– thank you. 
 
This policy disclaimer was not seen by the Preddy-Halls however, as their booking was 
made by Mr Preddy by telephone and Mrs Bull did not follow her usual practice of asking 
by whom the room was to be occupied.8  When the Preddy-Halls arrived at the Hotel on 5 
  
6  At [9] per Hale LJ. 
7  At [9] per Hale LJ. 
8  At [10] per Hale LJ. 
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September they were told that they could not stay as the double-bedded rooms were for 
married couples only. The Preddy-Halls explained that they were in a civil partnership. Mr 
Quinn responded that as the Bulls and he were devout Christians they did not believe in 
civil partnerships, recognising only marriage between a man and a woman.9  Although not 
done in a demeaning manner, this was “very hurtful” to the Preddy-Halls as there were 
other guests present.10  The Preddy-Halls sought alternative accommodation. 
 
B Basis of the Claim and Procedural History 
The proceedings were initially launched in the Bristol County Court with the assistance of 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission (“the UK Commission”) after the Bulls 
rejected the contention that they had discriminated against the Preddy-Halls. The case was 
brought under the Equality Act 2006 (UK). The Act established the UK Commission and 
extended previous prohibitions of discriminatory treatment to, among other things, the 
provision of goods, facilities and services.11  Sexual orientation became a prohibited ground 
of discrimination through the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 (UK) 
(“the Regulations”).12  The key issue for the purpose of this paper was whether the policy 
amounted to direct or indirect discrimination. This is the key issue as it helps to identify 
what approach the Court takes to the principle of non-discrimination.  
 
The United Kingdom employs a distinction between direct and indirect discrimination. It 
is not that direct discrimination can never be justified it is simply that all justifications are 
expressed in the legislation. It can also become more important when there is a clash of 
two competing rights.13  Direct discrimination is where one person treats another less 
favourably on the grounds of a protected characteristic under the legislation.14  While 
  
9  At [10] per Hale LJ. 
10  At [10] per Hale LJ. 
11  At [3] per Hale LJ. 
12  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 (UK), reg 4(1). 
13  Lady Hale “The Conflict of Equalities” (Alison Weatherfield Memorial Lecture, Employment 
Lawyers Association, 10 July 2008). 
14  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (UK), reg 3(1).  
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indirect discrimination can be characterised as a policy or practice that is prima facie 
neutral yet leads to an adverse impact on a protected group.15  It was acknowledged many 
times that this distinction is not easily defined.16   
 
In the United Kingdom non-discrimination law must be read in a manner compatible with 
the right to religious freedom under the European Convention of Human Rights (“the 
ECHR”).17 The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) imposes a positive obligation on the courts 
to interpret all legislation compatible with the ECHR. This includes, relevant to this case, 
art 9 of the ECHR – the right to manifest religion without unjustified limitation by the state 
and art 14 of the ECHR – the right to enjoy the rights under the ECHR (specifically art 8, 
the right to respect of private life) without unjustified discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation. Regulations incompatible with the ECHR can be ignored.18 
 
In the Bristol County Court his Honour Judge Rutherford held that the discrimination was 
direct.19  When considering whether or not the Regulations were incompatible with the 
Bulls’ rights under the ECHR, his Honour held that in so far as the Regulations affect the 
Bulls’ right to freedom of religion it is “a necessary and proportionate intervention by the 
state to protect the rights of others.”20  His Honour further held that if he was wrong and 
this was in fact a case about indirect discrimination the discrimination would not be 
justified.21 
 
  
15  Michael Connolly Discrimination Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2011) at 153; Schnorbus v Land 
Hessen (Case C-79/99) [2000] ECR I-10997 at [33]; Karon Monaghan Equality Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 10 and Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (UK), reg 
3(3). 
16  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [16] per Hale LJ, [64] per Toulson LJ and Hall v Bull [2011] EW Misc 2 
(CC) (04 January 2011) at [26]. 
17  Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 3. 
18  Human Rights Act (UK), s 3. 
19  At [37]. 
20  At [39]. 
21  At [54]. 
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The Bulls appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was dismissed with the Court 
finding that the Bulls’ actions amounted to direct discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation. The Court was convinced by the Preddy-Halls’ argument that a married couple 
was the correct comparator group for a couple in a civil partnership due to reg 3(4).22  The 
legislature had made clear that this was the purpose of the provision and this decision would 
help to enable the legislation to have its desired effect.23  The Court also held that the 
limitation on the Bulls’ rights under art 9 of ECHR was necessary in a democratic society 
for the protection of others.24  The Bulls then appealed to the Supreme Court. 
 
C Supreme Court Decision 
The appeal to the Supreme Court focused on three main issues.25 The first issue was 
whether this was a case of direct or indirect discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation. Secondly, if it was indirect discrimination whether the policy was justified 
under regulation 3(3)(d). Thirdly, if it was unlawful discrimination (direct or indirect and 
unjustified) whether the Regulations must be “read and given effect” to comply with the 
Bulls’ ECHR rights.26   
 
1 Direct or Indirect Discrimination 
The majority held that this was a case of direct discrimination. Lady Hale acknowledged 
that at first glance that this may not be direct discrimination as “while all same sex couples 
were denied, so too were some opposite sex couples [those not married].”27  The difference 
lay in the fact that the Preddy-Halls were in a civil partnership which proved crucial to the 
majority’s reasoning.28 
  
22  Bull v Hall [2012] EWCA Civ 83 [2012] 1 WLR 2514 at [39] per Rafferty LJ. 
23  At [38] per Rafferty LJ; Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (UK), Explanatory note. 
24  At [51] per Rafferty LJ. 
25  At [15] per Hale LJ. 
26  Human Rights Act (UK), s 3. 
27  At [21] per Hale LJ. 
28  At [25] per Hale LJ. 
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In 2008 when the discriminatory actions took place it was not possible for same sex couples 
to enter into marriage.29  In place of marriage the United Kingdom Parliament created the 
institution of civil partnerships, which was solely reserved for same sex couples.30 Lady 
Hale recognised that this was not just a contractual relationship between two parties. When 
a couple entered into a civil partnership there was a change in status and this status carried 
with it rights and obligations that were indistinguishable from those impressed on married 
couples.31  The equivalence of status is also illustrated by the Regulations which instructed 
that the fact that one person was married and the other in a civil partnership should not be 
a material difference.32 
 
It is important to note that reg 3(4) does not turn what would otherwise be indirect 
discrimination into direct discrimination, as it applies to both types of discrimination, it 
serves a different function. 33  Lady Hale recognised that reg 3(4) directs that “people who 
are married and people who are civil partners are to be regarded as similarly situated.”34 
Lady Hale agreed with the Court of Appeal that the appropriate comparator group to a 
couple in a civil partnership was a married couple.35 Since marriage is reserved for 
heterosexual couples only, distinguishing discrimination based on marital status and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is difficult. Lady Hale said that there is an “exact 
correspondence between the advantage conferred and the disadvantage imposed in 
allowing a double bed to the one and denying it to the other.”36 The Bulls’ policy was 
absolute in relation non-heterosexuals but not in relations to heterosexuals and it therefore 
  
29  This has since been amended with the passage of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (UK). 
30  Civil Partnership Act (UK), s 3. 
31  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [26] per Hale LJ and Nicholas Bamforth, Maleiha Malik and Colm 
O’Cinneide Discrimination Law: Theory and Context (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008) at 735. 
32  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (UK), reg 3(4). 
33  At [27] per Hale LJ. 
34  At [27] per Hale LJ. 
35  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [27] per Hale LJ; Bull v Hall (CA), above n 22, at [37] per Rafferty LJ and 
Clare Fenton-Glynn “Replacing One Type of Oppression with Another? Same-Sex Couples and 
Religious Freedom” (2014) 73(1) CLJ 31 at 33. 
36  At [29] per Hale LJ. 
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discriminates against the Preddy-Halls because of their sexual orientation. Put another way, 
the criterion at the heart of the restriction that the Preddy-Halls should be married is 
necessarily linked with their sexual orientation. Once it is accepted that the civil partnership 
entitled the Preddy-Halls to be treated in the same way as a married couple, the only 
remaining basis for the difference in treatment was the Preddy-Halls’ sexual orientation.37 
 
Even without reg 3(4), directing the court to treat civil partnerships the same as marriage, 
Lady Hale, and possibly Lord Toulson,38 would have struggled to find that this was 
anything other than direct discrimination.39  They argued that as marriage is only for 
opposite sex couples and civil partnerships are solely reserved for same sex couples, it is 
hard to justify that entering into of a civil partnership would do nothing. It is an analogous 
status to marriage and can only be seen to direct the court to a comparison with a married 
couple for the purposes of discrimination.40  Lord Kerr would not have agreed with Lady 
Hale, the effect of reg 3(4) was to identify the correct comparator group, if this was not in 
place then it would have been indirect discrimination.41  His Lordship was not prepared to 
treat marriage and civil partnerships the same without direction from Parliament. Lord Kerr 
was supported in this argument by the minority. 
 
The minority held that this was not a case of direct discrimination. The minority held that 
rather than discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation the Bulls were 
discriminating on the ground of marital status. Lord Neuberger held that because the Bulls 
would have treated any unmarried heterosexual couple the same way it is not possible to 
say that the reasons for the discrimination was their sexual orientation.42  In the view of the 
minority, reg 3(4) did not assist the Preddy-Halls’ argument, rather it is a circular or self-
fulfilling regulation as “it assumes that the purpose of [reg] 3(4) is to render discrimination 
  
37  At [60] per Kerr LJ. 
38  At [70] per Toulson LJ. 
39  At [29] per Hale LJ. 
40  Bull v Hall (CA), above n 22, at [37] per Rafferty LJ and Fenton-Glynn, above n 35, at 33. 
41  At [62] per Kerr LJ. 
42  At [76] per Neuberger LJ. 
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in a case such as this direct, when that is the very question at issue.”43  Lord Neuberger 
went on to say that there is no reason as a matter of policy or logic why civil partnerships 
should be treated the same as a marriage and if that was Parliament’s intention then they 
would have been clearer.44  It was important for the minority to keep the law clear and not 
further muddy the already unclear distinction between direct and indirect discrimination.45  
 
The majority argued that what matters is the effect of the policy, not the reasons for 
implementing the policy.46  The reasons may be relevant when assessing the justification 
of indirect discrimination but they will not be relevant when deciding between direct and 
indirect discrimination. Lord Hughes took exception to this and said that the majority 
focused incorrectly on a characteristic of the Preddy-Halls.47  His Lordship identified three 
sub groups of people that would all be affected by this policy; same sex couples in a civil 
partnership; same sex couples not in a civil partnership and opposite sex unmarried 
couples.48  His Lordship’s argument was that if one were to treat heterosexuals the same as 
non-heterosexuals then this cannot be a case of direct discrimination as the protected 
characteristic of sexual orientation is not the reason for the discriminatory practice, it is 
being un-married.  
 
The Court continued to reason in the alternative as the Bulls accepted that their policy was 
indirect discrimination. It obviously puts non-heterosexuals as a group at a serious 
disadvantage when compared with heterosexuals, as the Preddy-Halls cannot enter into a 
status which the Bulls regard as marriage.49   The Court had to decide whether if being 
indirect discrimination it was justified. 
 
  
43  At [79] per Neuberger LJ. 
44  At [80] per Neuberger LJ. 
45  At [84] per Neuberger LJ. 
46  Hale LJ, “The Conflict of Equalities”, above n 13. 
47  At [89] per Hughes LJ. 
48  At [90] per Hughes LJ. 
49  At [33] per Hale LJ. 
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2 Justifiability of Indirect Discrimination 
The Bulls argued that the discrimination was indirect and that it was justified because of 
their deeply held religious beliefs. They did not think that they should be compelled to run 
their business in a way that facilitated, what they viewed as, sin.50  The Court rejected this 
argument. Taken to its logical conclusion it would mean that a subset of individuals, to 
whom discrimination laws did not apply, would be created. There are already exceptions 
in the Regulations which allow for discriminatory practice, these exceptions cover those 
who take other people into their own home and treat as members of the family,51 and 
religious organisations.52  The legislature has instructed that non-heterosexuals should not 
be treated any differently than their heterosexual counterparts except for carefully 
considered exceptions already expressed in statute. The same goes for religious individuals, 
they cannot be treated any differently because of their religious beliefs. If a non-
heterosexual couple refused to let a room to a religious couple they too could be brought 
before the courts under discrimination law. More importantly, the judgment is not casting 
doubt on the legality of the Bulls’ belief that non-heterosexual sexual relationships are 
sinful, the Court stated many times that this was the an opinion that was genuinely held. It 
is the expression and manifestation of the belief which treats a group of people less 
favourably that is unlawful.53 
 
Article 9 of the ECHR protects the Bulls’ right to freedom of religion. This right is subject 
to an internal qualifier which allows for limitations on the right that are prescribed by law 
and necessary in a democratic society for amongst other things the protection of the rights 
of others.54  In a pluralist society it is inevitable the beliefs and rights of some will not be 
compatible with others.55  The Court agreed that the Bulls are free to hold and manifest 
their beliefs in many different ways. They are prohibited, however, from doing so in the 
  
50  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [34] per Hale LJ. 
51  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (UK), reg 6(1). 
52  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (UK), reg 14.  
53  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [37] per Hale LJ. 
54  European Convention on Human Rights, art 9(2). 
55  Bull v Hall (CA), above n 22, at [56] per Rafferty LJ. 
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commercial context they have chosen.56  The purpose or motive of the policy is irrelevant, 
as Lord Kerr said57 
 
[W]e do not normally allow people to behave in a way which the law prohibits because 
they disagree with the law. But to allow discrimination against persons of homosexual 
orientation … because of a belief, however sincerely held, and however based on the 
biblical text, would be to do just that. 
 
The ordinary law gives the Preddy-Halls the right to be free from discriminatory practices 
and is considered necessary, so the question becomes whether the encroachment on the 
freedom of religion is ‘proportionate’.58 
 
The Court as a whole was prepared to accept that the concept of “reasonable 
accommodation” is part of the proportionality assessment when justifying indirect 
discrimination.59  Although the Bulls had offered a reimbursement of the deposit, had not 
acted in a demeaning manner and were prepared to offer the Preddy-Halls a twin bed room 
the Court held that there was no avoiding that what the Bulls did was prohibited by law.60  
The reason for this was that “sexual orientation is a core component of a person’s identity 
which requires fulfilment through relationships with others of the same orientation.”61  
Expressions of sexuality require a partner, whether they are real or imagined.62  In the 
Court’s view, very weighty reasons are required to justify discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation.63  These reasons were not present in this case.  
  
56  Bull v Hall (CA), above n 22, at [56] per Rafferty LJ. 
57  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [61] per Kerr LJ. See generally Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [37] per Hale LJ; 
Bull v Hall (CA), above n 22; James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751 and R (E) v 
Governing Body of JFS School [2009] UKSC 15 [2010] 2 AC 728. 
58  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [45] per Hale LJ. 
59  At [47] per Hale LJ. 
60  At [50] to [52] per Hale LJ. 
61  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [52] per Hale LJ. 
62  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 at [117] per 
Sachs J. 
63  At [53] per Hale LJ. 
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III Analysis of the Judgment 
When analysing the judgment it will become clear that the majority was correct in 
categorising this as a case of direct discrimination. The majority’s approach was consistent 
with accepting that non-heterosexual relationships are worthy of equal respect as 
heterosexual relationships. The minority, branding the discrimination as indirect, was 
excessively focused on black letter law. Determined to solidify the difference between non-
heterosexuals and heterosexuals and the rights they hold. As will become clear the aims of 
the principle non-discrimination demand a more substantive equality. 
 
A Aims of Non-Discrimination Law 
Butler and Butler describe the principle of non-discrimination as being central in a 
democratic society “where each individual is valued as a person, worthy of dignity and 
respect.”64  In this regard the principle of non-discrimination aims to promote equality of 
treatment. I will focus on two possible formulations of this principle, each with its own 
merits. First formal equality, treating all people equally, the standard and results of which 
are not of concern. Second substantive equality which “demands that social justice and 
equality is meaningful and real to disadvantaged groups.”65 
 
Formal equality only demands that two groups of people are treated the same. The equality 
of law “which forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges”.66  The 
proliferation of this doctrine was demonstrated in the United States of America with the 
separate but equal doctrine.67  Formal equality is approached with a view of equality set by 
men, and is strict in its application of equal treatment not more favourable treatment. The 
fact that either Mr Preddy or Mr Hall could have stayed at the Bulls’ hotel, if married to a 
  
64  Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (Lexis Nexis, 
Wellington, 2005) at 483. 
65  Connolly, above n 15, at 11. 
66  Sandra Fredman Discrimination Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 1 citing 
Anatole France Le Lys Rouge (Calmann-Levy, Parris, 1972) at 106. 
67  Connolly, above n 15, at 10. 
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woman, would have satisfied formal equality.68 Either parties could have married, if they 
made a choice not to do so, as Gault J seemed to reason in Quilter, then they would have 
chosen the discrimination.69 Or perhaps more drastically if a female non-heterosexual 
couple were also refused service then this would be equal treatment and not discriminatory, 
as both non-heterosexual men and women were treated identically.70 This is because the 
law is concerned with treating like as like.71 There is less room for an individualised 
comparator group.72   A notion of equality which stresses equal opportunities is consistent 
with inequality of treatment and inequality of results.73   
 
Substantive equality would demand that both heterosexual and non-heterosexual couples 
are accepted in the hotel. It recognises the difference in the individuals, rather than 
removing or avoiding the difference, and removes the disadvantage imposed by that 
difference.74 Substantive equality suggests that the state has a role to play, as the cost of 
remedying the discriminatory treatment rests with society as a whole, and the state not 
doing anything may be seen as perpetuating the discrimination.75  I acknowledge that this 
may be a step too far in many cases, as the state should not be responsible for the acts of 
individual citizens. Substantive equality demands an equality of results in society, not just 
opportunity, which recognises that the starting point is not the same for all groups in 
society. The Preddy-Halls, as committed partners in a legally recognised partnership of 
mutual trust, love and respect, should be able to enjoy the same results as a married 
couple.76  There should be equal recognition of non-heterosexual and heterosexual 
relationships.77   
  
68  Connolly, above n 15, at 7. 
69  Quilter v Attorney General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 at 527, per Gault J and Butler and Butler, above n 
64, at 491. 
70  Connolly, above n 15, at 6. 
71  Connolly, above n 15, at 5. 
72  Connolly, above n 15, at 6. 
73  Fredman, above n 66, at 2. 
74  Fredman, above n 66, at 30. 
75  Connolly, above n 15, at 11.  
76  Connolly, above n 15, at 13. 
77  Fredman, above n 66, at 86. 
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B Analysis of Direct Discrimination 
The majority has been clear that the courts have a role in ensuring the discriminatory 
practices are not recognised as legitimate. In this section of the paper I will discuss why 
the majority’s approach was the correct approach, acknowledging that the majority was 
right to recognise that non-heterosexual relationships deserve the same respect as 
heterosexual relationships under the law. 
 
In 2008 when the discriminatory actions took place it was not possible for same sex couples 
to enter into marriage.78  In place of marriage the United Kingdom had the institution of 
civil partnerships, which was solely reserved for same sex couples.79  When introduced the 
Deputy Minister for Women and Equality explained this legislation as “a sign of the 
Government’s commitment to social justice and equality.”80  Essentially, the Government 
was attempting to introduce ‘gay marriage’ although they avoided that phrase.81  This was 
not just a contractual relationship between two parties. When a couple entered into a civil 
partnership there was a change in status and this status carried with it rights and obligations 
that were indistinguishable from those impressed on married couples.82  By classing the 
Bulls’ policy as direct discrimination the majority has taken an important real world view 
of non-heterosexual rights and relationships, a view achieved through the imposition of 
substantive equality.83  It is not possible to separate the sexual orientation and the institution 
which people are permitted to enter, any less favourable treatment must be on the basis of 
sexual orientation.84   
 
  
78  This has been amended with the passage of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act (UK). 
79  Civil Partnership Act (UK). 
80  (12 October 2004) 425 GBPD HC 174. 
81  Bamforth, Malik and O’Cinneide, above n 31, at 735. 
82  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [26] per Hale LJ and Bamforth Malik and O’Cinneide, above n 31, at 735. 
83  See generally Laura-Jane Houghton “Same-sex Marriage: A Perfectionist Liberal Justification” 
(2000) 7 UCL Juris. Rev. 301. 
84  Fenton-Glynn, above n 35, at 34. 
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Lady Hale rightfully rejected the contention that non-heterosexuals can enter into marriage. 
Although legally possible, to entertain this argument that a non-heterosexual man can 
marry a woman, thus avoiding the discriminatory policy, is demeaning and trivialises that 
individual’s sexual orientation. A similar argument to this was accepted in New Zealand 
by Gault J in Quilter.85  Gault J did not accept that the restriction of marriage to a man and 
a woman only was discriminatory as “denial of choice always effects only those who wish 
to make the choice. It is not for that reason discriminatory”86  Such logic and formal 
equality reasoning has since been rejected in New Zealand as it should be in the UK.87  One 
cannot separate the branding of the Preddy-Hall’s relationship form their sexual 
orientation.88 
 
The majority was alive to the fact that they have a role in ‘safeguarding’ rights.89 To 
recognise the respect that should be given to non-heterosexual relationships as legitimate 
and stable relationships that seek out love, support and partnership.90  In this quest they are 
no different from people of heterosexual orientation and their relationships.91 Rather than 
perpetuating the discrimination of the law, the majority has recognised that one should not 
underestimate the continuing legacy of centuries of discrimination, even persecution, on 
the grounds of sexual orientation.92  The decision of the majority to class this discrimination 
as direct has not meant however, that the Bulls are not free to manifest their religion in 
other ways. They are still free to use religious symbolism in their facilities, free to allow 
religious sermons to take place and religious groups to use their facilities, they may even 
promote their religion in their establishment.93  Nevertheless, not every act inspired by a 
religious belief will be protected by art 9 of the ECHR. The convention does not apply to 
  
85  Quilter v Attorney General, above n 69, at 527. 
86  Quilter v Attorney General, above n 69, at 527. 
87  Butler and Butler, above n 64, at 491. 
88  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [67] per Toulson LJ. 
89  Bamforth, Malik and O’Cinneide, above n 31, at 26. 
90  Houghton, above n 83, at 301. 
91  Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 3 WLR 113 HL at [142] per Hale LJ and (12 October 2004) 425 
GBPD HC 174. 
92  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [53] per Hale LJ. 
93  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [39] per Hale LJ. 
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beliefs, no matter how honestly held, that are incompatible with human dignity.94  These 
are deemed to be outside of the scope of art 9 and not worthy of protection themselves 
considering the aim of the ECHR.95  The Court did not go so far as say that the Bulls’ belief 
fit into this category, but the more that a right infringes on the rights of others the more 
likely any intrusion is going to be considered justified.96  The United Kingdom Parliament 
has recognised the tension that the Regulations may have with religious groups which is 
why they have dedicated an exception for “religious organisations” not for religious 
individuals more generally. This gives force to the argument that further concessions 
should be pragmatically advanced as Parliament did not consider it necessary.97 
 
The minority was not convinced of the direct discrimination arguments. Lord Neuberger 
did not think that Parliament intended that civil partnerships and marriage should be given 
the same standing. This is a curious approach as Parliament expressly stated in the 
Regulations that civil partnerships and marriage should not be treated as materially 
different when assessing a discriminatory practice.98  Hansard debates show that the 
Government was trying to do was give non-heterosexual couples the same standing as 
married couples, albeit with a different label.99 
 
Both the majority and minority acknowledged that reg 3(4) did not create direct 
discrimination where there is none, rather it gives guidance as to the appropriate 
  
94  R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 
246 at [23] per Nicholls J; Monaghan, above n 15, at 153 and James Dingemans, Can Yeginsu, Tom 
Cross and Hafsah Massod The Protections for Religious Rights: Law and Practice (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013) at [3.18]. 
95  Dinhemans, Yegunsu, Cross and Massod, above n 94, at [3.18] and Campbell and Cosans v UK 
(1982) 4 EHRR 293 at [36]. 
96  Monaghan, above n 15, at 153. 
97  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [38] per Hale LJ. 
98  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (UK), reg 3(4); since reinforced by the Equality Act 
2010 (UK), s 23(3). 
99  (12 October 2004) 425 GBPD HC 174; (24 June 2004) 662 GBPD HL 1354-91 and Bamforth, Malik 
and O’Cinneide, above n 31, at 735. 
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comparator group.100  It emphasises that when approaching the question of direct or indirect 
discrimination, one must not consider a difference in the status of marriage and civil 
partnership. This in turn exposes the appropriate comparator group. By casting the 
comparator as all unmarried couples Lord Neuberger has ignored the status change in the 
Preddy-Halls from entering into a civil partnership. Lord Neuberger has built in a “tacit 
acceptance of a disputed policy at too early a stage and artificially removes the disputed 
point of discrimination.”101  Parliament attempted to promote stability and equality, Lord 
Neuberger has ignored the real world trials of non-heterosexual couples. 
 
Lord Hughes reasoned that the correct approach to non-discrimination legislation was to 
focus on the discriminator’s reasons for treating the discriminated as they did. It is not the 
intention of the parties that is relevant however, it is the effect of the policy, practice or 
criterion that is adopted.102  Relying on a subjective position to determine a discriminatory 
practice would frustrate the law’s purpose.103  Rather than producing objective equality, it 
would produce a subjective assessment of equality which might not be equal at all. Human 
rights are not a subjective entitlement but an inherent right of being human.104  The minority 
failed to take a real world view of the situation which non-heterosexuals find themselves. 
In effect the minority has rendered the status change as something less than marriage and 
nothing more than a de facto relationship between heterosexual partners, not recognising 
the same conditions exist between the two couples, just with a different title.105  When the 
  
100  Fenton-Glynn, above n 35, at 33. 
101  Vanessa Haggie “Premature Justification: The Place of Comparator Group Analysis in 
Discrimination Law in Canada and New Zealand” (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2012) at 13 and Asher Emanuel “To Whom Will Ye Liken Me, and Make Me Equal? 
Reformulating the Role of the Comparator in the Identification of Discrimination” (2014) 45 
VUWLR 1 at 7. 
102  Hale, “The Conflict of Equalities”, above n 13; Connolly, above n 15, at 1 and Monaghan, above n 
15 at 343. See generally Birmingham City Council v Equal Opportunities Commission [1989] AC 
1155 and James v Eastleigh Borough Council, above n 57. 
103  Bamforth, Malik and O’Cinneide, above n 31 at 237. 
104  See generally Butler and Butler, above n 64 and Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill 
of Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003). 
105  Houghton, above n 83, at 318. 
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case was decided there was no possibility of non-heterosexuals marrying, save for rejecting 
their inherent dignity and self-worth by marrying someone who does not share the same 
sexual orientation.106  The minority’s approach is a result of the formal equality conception 
of non-discrimination law. 
 
C Analysis of Justification of Indirect Discrimination 
The Bulls did not attempt to justify their discrimination on the ground of a real business 
need.107  Rather justification was sought on the basis of a conflict of rights and the reduction 
of their freedom of religion.108  The Court rejected this argument. The sexual orientation 
of a person is an intrinsic and fundamental aspect of that person’s life. The Court 
recognised that very weighty reasons are required for justification of indirect 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.109  The Bulls right to religion contained 
an internal qualification.110  It could be limited to ensure the rights of others were observed. 
The Bulls are able to express their rights in other ways such as religious imagery, religious 
services and renting their premises to church groups. Their right to religion did not 
however, allow them to discriminate against people based on that person’s sexual 
orientation. This is not case of replacing one discrimination with another. The United 
Kingdom has recognised that there may be conflict between religion and non-heterosexual 
sexual orientation, and has legislated for express exceptions,111 similar to New Zealand not 
obliging celebrants to solemnise marriage which conflict with their religious beliefs. 112   It 
is not the role of the courts to create further exceptions. 
 
  
106  Houghton, above n 83, at 309. 
107  Fredman, above n 66, at 193. 
108  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [34] per Hale LJ.  
109  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [53] per Hale J. 
110  European Convention of Human Rights, art 9. 
111  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (UK), reg 14. 
112  Marriage Act 1955, s 29. 
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IV Comparison of Non-Discrimination Laws and Processes 
The majority judgment in Bull v Hall recognises the importance of substantive equality. 
With the majority holding the Regulations required the Court to treat a civil partnership 
and marriage the same. New Zealand courts have been slower to recognise this concept. In 
this part of the paper I will illustrate the differences in approach to the principle of non-
discrimination between the two jurisdictions. First I will do this by a threefold comparison 
of the non-discrimination regimes. I will then move on to exploring the Pilgrim Planet 
discrimination.  
 
A Legislative Comparison 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“BORA”) affirms the right to be free from 
discrimination on the 13 grounds set out in the Human Rights Act 1993 (“the NZHRA”), 
which includes sexual orientation.113  The NZHRA prohibits action, such as the provision 
of goods and services, taken “by reason of” a prohibited ground, subject to express 
exceptions.114  Unlike the United Kingdom which defines both direct and indirect 
discrimination,115 neither BORA nor the NZHRA defines direct discrimination. The only 
legislative guidance is a negative definition of discrimination being any “[m]easures taken 
in good faith for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups disadvantaged 
because of discrimination” not constituting discrimination and the definition of indirect 
discrimination in s 65 of the NZHRA.116   
 
The New Zealand courts have had varying levels of success in interpreting discrimination. 
In Quilter three long term female couples appealed to the Court of Appeal that the Marriage 
Act 1955 did not allow for marriages between two persons of the same sex.117  The majority 
found that there was no discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation because it would 
  
113  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 19. 
114  Human Rights Act 1993, s 44. 
115  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation Regulations) (UK), regs 3(1) and 3(3). 
116  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 19(2) and Human Rights Act, s 65. 
117  Quilter v Attorney-General, above n 69, at 526 per Gault J. 
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have been the same regardless of whether or not the applicants were of non-heterosexual 
orientation, i.e. heterosexual females attempting to gain benefits from marriage.118  Gault 
J also held that “denial of choice always affects those who wish to make the choice. It is 
not for that reason discriminatory”.119  Which may be formal equality, all women can 
marry, as long as they choose to marry men, but it does not fit the standard of the more 
desirable substantive equality. Gault J held that because marriage, as a long standing 
convention, was between man and a woman it could not be discriminatory.120  Longevity 
of a practice however, does not make it non-discriminatory when assessed against human 
rights norms.121  Further AMM and KJO centred on the interpretation of ‘spouse’ in the 
Adoption Act 1955 and whether it could be read to include a de facto couple.122  The Court 
held that it could be read to include a heterosexual de facto couple but not a non-
heterosexual one. The Court suggested that a non-heterosexual de facto couple was not a 
“stable and committed family unit”.123  The Court attempted to further justify their 
reasoning by stating that there was no concession from the Attorney-General that there was 
unjustified discrimination against non-heterosexual couples as there was with heterosexual 
couples.124 
 
It has now been recognised that a broad purposive approach should be taken when 
interpreting non-discrimination laws, keeping with the broader BORA interpretation 
approach.125  A rights consistent approach was adopted in Atkinson, where it was held that 
there is discrimination if the claimant is treated differently on a prohibited ground resulting 
in a material disadvantage.126  The United Kingdom requires that there be ‘less favourable’ 
  
118  At 527 per Gault J. 
119  At 527 per Gault J. 
120  At 527 per Gault J. 
121  Butler and Butler, above n 64, at 492 citing examples of criminalisation of birth control and sodomy. 
122  Re application by AMM and KJO to adopt a child [2010] NZFLR 629 (HC). 
123  At [36]. 
124  The Attorney-General did however make this concession which was further clarified in a 
memorandum to the court. 
125  Butler and Butler above n 64 at 75; Paul Rishworth and others, above n 104, at 377 and Ministry of 
Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456 at [101]. 
126  Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 125, at [136]. 
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treatment,127 which would incorporate the same negative concept, requiring invidious 
treatment, not mere differentiation.128  This may be a lower standard than New Zealand 
however, as New Zealand requires that the disadvantage conferred must be more than 
trivial, the de minimis rule.129 The de minimis rule is favoured in New Zealand as it 
prevents a trivialising of the right to discrimination claims. 130 
 
As with the United Kingdom’s approach there is a requirement to identify the correct 
comparator group when assessing the discriminatory practice. While an in depth discussion 
of comparator group is outside the scope of this paper, one thing is important to note.131  
There is a propensity to import justification into the identification of a comparator group, 
by framing the comparator too wide or drawing a conclusion that the two groups are not 
comparable.132  This is unappealing as it creates “decision making based on instinct rather 
than analysis”.133 
 
When identifying a discriminatory practice, justification should not form part of the 
inquiry. Justification of a directly discriminatory practice is obtained through s 5 of BORA 
not through the framing of the policy itself.134  If the practice can be justified in a free and 
democratic society then the discriminatory practice will not be unlawful. There is no 
general limitation against direct discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the 
United Kingdom. When considering indirect discrimination however, if there is a good 
reason for the policy or it can be justified by reference to other matters it will not be 
discriminatory at all.135  Direct discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation could 
  
127  Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (UK), reg 3(1). 
128  Rishworth and others, above n 104, at 376 and Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 125, at at 
[109] 
129  Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 125, at [136]. 
130  Rishworth and others, above n 104, at 376. 
131  For a more in depth discussion of comparator groups see: Haggie, above n 101 and Emanuel, above 
n 101. 
132  Emanuel, above n 101, at 7. 
133  Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 125, at [128]. 
134  Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 125, at [128] and [132]. 
135  Human Rights Act, s 65 and Equality Act (Sexual Orientation Regulations) (UK), reg 3(3). 
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only be justified if one of the statutory exceptions was met.136  While there must be ‘good 
reasons’ for allowing indirect discrimination. Justification should not be sought through 
the comparator as this creates a weak rights culture as discrimination is less broadly defined 
and the right is limited which defeats the purpose of the act.137 
 
B Process 
Resolution of discrimination complaints is one of the core functions of both the New 
Zealand Human Rights Commission (“the NZHRC”) and the UK Commission.138  The 
NZHRC approaches this task in the most cost effective, efficient and informal manner.139  
The NZHRC no longer has the ability to investigate a complaint and offers an alternative 
dispute resolution process instead.140  The UK Commission has the power to hold 
conciliation meetings, issue compliance notices, initiate investigations and initiate 
proceedings.141    
 
The NZHRC provides state funded mediation to parties of a discrimination complaint.142  
In the 2013 annual report the NZHRC recorded that they received 1228 complaints alleging 
unlawful discrimination which were referred to mediation.143  Of these only 32 were 
complaints on the ground of sexual orientation.144  The dispute resolution process is 
designed to raise awareness of rights and responsibilities under the NZHRA, while 
encouraging discussion about the impact of discrimination.145  The NZHRC is not obliged 
  
136  See generally Equality Act (Sexual Orientation Regulations) (UK). 
137  Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 125, at [128] and Emanuel, above n 101, at 7. 
138  Human Rights Act, s76(1)(b); New Zealand Human Rights Commission “About the Human Rights 
Commission” <www.hrc.co.nz>; Equality Act (UK) 2006, s 3; and Equality and Human Rights 
Commission “Our Mission and Values” <www.equalityhumanrights.com>. 
139  Attorney-General v Human Rights Review Tribunal (2006) 18 PRNZ 295 (HC) at [43] per Miller J. 
140  Human Rights Law Human Rights Act (online ed) at [76.02]. 
141  Equality Act 2006 (UK), Part 1. 
142  The Laws of New Zealand Human Rights and Freedoms: Human Rights Act 1993 (online ed) at 
[203]. 
143  Human Rights Commission 2013 Annual Report at 18. 
144  Human Rights Commission 2013 Annual Report at 20. 
145  Human Rights Commission 2013 Annual Report at 21. 
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to provide legal advice to parties during the dispute resolution process.146  Which may 
cause significant power imbalances or rights to be compromised.147  The dispute mediation 
is a confidential process between the parties.148 If the discrimination is trivial, vexatious or 
is not in good faith or the complaint has been made more than 12 months after the 
complainant became aware of the matter then the NZHRC has the right to dismiss the 
complaint.149  If a complaint is not resolved by the NZHRC then a complainant has the 
right to apply to the Human Rights Review Tribunal. The Tribunal will only have 
jurisdiction if the complainant has first attempted to resolve the issue through the 
alternative dispute resolution methods imposed by the NZHRC.150   
 
The case can be taken to the Tribunal by the Office of Human Rights Proceedings on behalf 
of a complainant or by the complainant themselves, provided they have first complained to 
the NZHRC.151  Legal aid can be accessed for cases before the Tribunal providing the 
standard criteria are met.152  Any party to a proceeding may appeal the Tribunal’s decision 
through the courts in the usual manner.153 The Tribunal also has the power to enforce 
settlements that have been breached.154   
 
Rather than focusing on mediation and confidential conciliation services, the UK 
Commission is more focused on investigation and assessment of the law. The UK 
Commission in their most recent strategic plan has outlined that they will focus on funding 
discrimination cases and intervening in other legal proceedings going forward.155  The UK 
Commission views this as the best way to help improve the lives of many in setting new 
  
146  Human Rights Act, s 77(2)(a). 
147  Human Rights Law Human Rights Act (online ed) at [77.02]. 
148  Human Rights Act, s 85. 
149  Human Rights Act, s 80(2) and 80(3)(b). 
150  Human Rights Act, 92B(1)(c). 
151  Human Rights Act, s 92B. 
152  Legal Services Act 2011, s 7(1)(e)(v). 
153  Human Rights Act, ss 123(2) and 124 and Rishworth and others, above n 104, at 396. 
154  Human Rights Act, s 92B(4). 
155  Equality and Human Rights Commission, Strategic Plan 2012-215 at [27]. 
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precedent.156  While acknowledging that the parties could resolve the disputes themselves 
there is no bar to taking proceeding to the County Court. The United Kingdom does not 
have a specialised tribunal to deal with general discrimination claims. 
 
C Remedies  
While settlement agreements may include financial compensation the Tribunal has the 
power to award damages where there has been unlawful discrimination.157  When providing 
damages for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings, which sexual orientation 
discrimination cases often will, any damages must have regard to the attitude of the 
defendant.158  The Tribunal must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the 
defendant has engaged in unlawful discrimination.159 
 
The remedies available to the United Kingdom’s County Court are similar to that of the 
Tribunal. The Court can make a declaration of unlawful discrimination, impose an 
injunction, award compensation and issue an order for costs.160  If there are facts from 
which the Court could decide that there was discrimination and there was no other 
explanation the Court must hold that the discrimination existed.161   
 
D Pilgrim Planet Lodge: A Case Study 
 
It is important for clarity that the two approaches are not just evaluated by comparisons of 
the legislation and reasoning of previous cases. A case study will allow the differences of 
  
156  Equality and Human Rights Commission “Can the Commission Tell Me  
If I’ve Been Discriminated Against Under the Act?” <www.equalityhumanrights.com>. 
157  HR 83.02 Human Rights Act 1993 s 92I; Butler and Butler, above n 64, at 530 and Laws of New 
Zealand Discrimination (online ed) at [113]. See generally Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent’s 
Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
158  Human Rights Commission v Ocean Beach Freezing Co Ltd (1981) 2 NZAR 415 (EOT) at 428. 
159  Laws of New Zealand Discrimination (online ed) at [113]. 
160  Equality Act 2010 (UK), s 119. 
161  Equality Act 2010 (UK), s 136. 
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approach to become fully evident. In May 2013 Jane Collinson and Paula Knights (“the 
Collinson-Knights”), a couple engaged to get married, were denied a double bedded room 
at the Pilgrim Planet Lodge in Whangarei. The Ruskins, the owners, did not recognise same 
sex relationships due to their religious beliefs. The Ruskins believed that their commercial 
enterprise was covered by an exception in the NZHRA which allows discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation for the purpose of “residential accommodation which is to be 
shared with the person disposing of the accommodation, or on whose behalf it is disposed 
of.”162  
 
The Collinson-Knights complained to the NZHRC. As per the legislative requirements they 
were directed to confidential mediation.163  In this mediation the NZHRC was not obliged 
to provide legal support to get the parties to better understand their rights.164  The 
Collinson-Knights accepted the mediation settlement, the contents of which are 
confidential. 165  The settlement means the complaint was not able to proceed to the Human 
Rights Review Tribunal. The Ruskins have confirmed they will continue to deny non-
heterosexual couples a room. 166 
 
The wider issue of discrimination against non-heterosexuals and interpretation of the law 
has not been resolved. Although an apology was provided, the Ruskins are not changing 
their discriminatory practice and if the couple attempted to stay again they would again be 
turned away. This case shows that the NZHRC’s focus on mediation, while it may provide 
some movement by the parties, does not help resolve the wider issue of discriminatory 
practice and interpretation of human rights statutes. Unlike the United Kingdom, where the 
highest court was able to pronounce publically what was and was not acceptable, New 
Zealand has been left without such a pronouncement and continuing discrimination. If the 
  
162  Human Rights Act, s 54. 
163  Human Rights Act, s 77.  
164  Human Rights Act, s 77(2)(a). 
165  Mathew Dearnaley “Apology, But Gays Still Not Welcome” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 11 July 2013). 
166  Dearnaley, above n 165. 
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Collinson-Knights had not accepted the apology from the Ruskins and asked the Tribunal 
to intervene, they may not have been funded by the NZHRC, unlike the Preddy-Halls.167 
 
The United Kingdom’s approach to discrimination facilitated the denouncement of the 
discriminatory policy and clarification of non-discrimination law. Whereas the analogous 
fact situation in New Zealand was confined to confidential mediation. 
 
V Is There a Preferred Approach to Discrimination Claims  
New Zealand has chosen a different path to the United Kingdom in order to settle 
discrimination claims. With a focus more centred on mediation rather than litigation. In 
this part of the paper I will analyse the advantages and disadvantages of each approach in 
meeting the aims of the principle of non-discrimination and building a rights culture. 
 
A Litigation or Mediation: What is the Preferred Approach? 
Formal equality is not sufficient to show respect for the inherent dignity and self-worth of 
people as they may still be forced to act a certain way to receive equal treatment.168 Every 
man is able to marry whether non-heterosexual or heterosexual if they marry a woman. 
Thus achieving formal equality. Once it is recognised that substantive equality is the ideal 
destination the most effective way of achieving this should be employed, to ensure that the 
principle of non-discrimination is achieved. The fundamental premise of this paper is that 
there needs to be an increased recognition and respect for non-heterosexual rights, in 
particular where they conflict with religious rights.  
 
Mediation is often portrayed as the cheaper, faster and more effective way to settle 
disputes.169  Which has prompted mediation and conciliation to be a starting point in many 
  
167  Annual reports form the Human Rights Commission show a steady decline in the number of cases 
taken by the Office of Human Rights Proceedings, from around 17 per cent of applications in 2009 
to 9 per cent of applications in 2013. 
168  Butler and Butler, above n 64, at 483. 
169  David Spencer and Michael Brogan Mediation Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006) at 134. 
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jurisdiction for discrimination claims. Mediation as a process is more familiar to a wider 
range of cultures and can be adapted further, compared to a more rigid legal system.170 This 
can make it more attractive to complainants in discrimination cases. The possibility of the 
mediator reducing the power imbalances is also seen as a positive factor in mediation. 
There is however, the possibility that the mediator will also carry with them cultural 
baggage and bias and in some cases can re-enforce the power imbalances that are present 
in society.171  While it may be more likely that a settlement is reached as each party takes 
the time to understand the other’s position, mediation outcomes often reflect interests not 
rights.172  As a consequence more flexible outcomes are often a result.173  Whether or not 
this is a positive depends on the objective of the mediation. Is it a process to ensure that 
people’s rights are being respected or is a process to repair the harm that has been done by 
the discrimination. The NZHRC regards the Pilgrim Planet mediation as a success, even 
though the discriminatory policy will continue. Often participants in mediation just want 
to voice their concerns and be heard by the other party, being vindicated for the wrong, if 
this happens they may regard the mater as resolved.174 
 
Litigation has a more negative perception by the public as costly, in both financial and 
emotional terms, and as a complex process.175  Litigation has been criticised as being too 
focused on the formal equality outcome.176  As Quilter shows there is a possibility that the 
courts will focus on formal equality to avoid judicial activism. This can also be seen in Bull 
v Hall where Lord Kerr would not have given a substantive equality interpretation to the 
Regulations if reg 3(4) were not present.177  Nevertheless judicial apprehension should not 
be the factor which laments litigation to a backup to mediation. When the courts, as they 
are more willing to now do, focus on substantive equality there are many benefits. 
  
170  Tania Sourdin Alternative Dispute Resolution (4th ed, Thompson Reuters, Sydney, 2012) at 67. 
171  Sourdin, above n 170, at 85. 
172  Sourdin, above n 170, at 91. 
173  Sourdin, above n 170, at 91. 
174   Bamforth, Malik and O’Cinneide, above n 31 at 1168 and Sourdin, above n 170, at t 91. 
175  Sourdin, above n 170, at 450. 
176  Bamforth, Malik and O’Cinneide, above n 31 at 188. 
177  Bull v Hall, above n 4, at [62] per Kerr LJ. 
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Litigation breaks “the link with the individual plaintiff, thereby focusing on collective 
mechanisms to combat discrimination.”178  It allows for a public pronouncement of rights. 
Rather than focusing on the interests of the parties’ litigation focuses on the rights of those 
parties. Public pronouncement is needed before any social reform could take place.179  
Furthermore discrimination laws are not easily interpreted. The enforcement of laws and 
remedies in discrimination cases should not be underestimated in building a rights 
culture.180   
 
While some people may misunderstand their rights. This does not mean that their complaint 
has been motivated by malice. 181  There may have been genuinely hurtful comments or 
actions from the other party. The individual case may be best resolved through mediation 
but it does not assist in the understanding of rights more generally. This is because 
mediations are confidential and there is no obligation on the NZHRC to provide legal 
advice. The NZHRC’s focus is on resolving the complaint whether or not this is done in a 
consistent manner to previous complaints will be dependent on each of the parties’ 
understanding of their rights or each of the parties’ interests as the case may be. Some 
respondents may choose to make a pragmatic business decision and end the complaint as 
soon as possible and agree to a settlement which may be too one sided.182   With a steady 
decline in the amount of litigation undertaken by the Office of Human Rights Proceedings 
and no evidence of a case on the grounds of sexual orientation. These disputes are being 
relegated to mediation, where there may be a resolution of the specific case but there is no 
guarantee of their human rights being respected. Outcomes of discrimination claims have 
a wider reach and more positive societal impact when resolved through discrimination. 
This is one on the main reasons the UK Commission is focused on litigation to increase 
awareness of rights and to build a strong rights culture in the United Kingdom. 
  
178  Mark Bell Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2002) at 147. 
179  Spencer and Brogan, above n 169, at 117. 
180  Peter Cane Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart Publications, Oxford, 2002) at 44. 
181  Chris Ronalds and Elizabeth Raper Discrimination Law and Practice (4th ed, The Federation Press, 
Sydney 2012) at 171. 
182  Ronalds and Raper, above n 181, at 171. 
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VI Conclusion 
The majority of the Supreme Court in their decision in Bull v Hall has taken a real world 
view of the situation that non-heterosexual couples find themselves. No longer content with 
continuing the centuries of discrimination and persecution, the majority treated the Preddy-
Halls’ relationship with the dignity and respect it deserves. This was made possible by 
respecting the principle of non-discrimination and achieving a result that was most 
consistent with substantive equality. The public pronouncement by the Supreme Court has 
allowed more people to guide their actions and be resolute in their condemnation of 
discrimination against non-heterosexuals. 
 
This paper has shown that there are significant differences between New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom and how the two jurisdictions approach discrimination. Not only in the 
legislation and process but also in the ability to respect rights and produce greater 
understanding of non-discrimination laws. The contrast between Bull v Hall and the 
Pilgrim Planet discrimination has shown that these differences have a significant effect on 
the outcome and wider consequences of the dispute resolution process.  
 
These differences mean that in New Zealand the resolution of discrimination claims does 
not impact the wider society. The focus on compulsory mediation means any resolution is 
limited in its effect to the parties of the dispute. Whether or not this needs to change 
depends on what New Zealand wants to achieve through its non-discrimination regime. 
This paper has shown the benefit of allowing discrimination claims to be more readily 
litigated. The judicial community has shown recently a commitment to substantive equality 
and as such litigation of discrimination disputes should be available so that understanding 
of human rights and the dignity and worth of all individuals can be respected. 
 
 
Word Count: The text of this paper (excluding the cover page, contents page, bibliographic 
and contextual footnotes, appendix and bibliography) consists of exactly 7993 words.  
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VII Appendix 
A Equality Act (Sexual Orientation Regulations) 2007 (UK) 
3 - Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation 
 
1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person ("A") discriminates against another 
("B") if, on grounds of the sexual orientation of B or any other person except A, A 
treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat others (in cases where there is 
no material difference in the relevant circumstances). 
2) In paragraph (1) a reference to a person’s sexual orientation includes a reference to 
a sexual orientation which he is thought to have 
3) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person ("A") discriminates against another 
("B") if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice – 
a. which he applies or would apply equally to persons not of B's sexual 
orientation, 
b. which puts persons of B's sexual orientation at a disadvantage compared to 
some or all others (where there is no material difference in the relevant 
circumstances), 
c. which puts B at a disadvantage compared to some or all persons who are 
not of his sexual orientation (where there is no material difference in the 
relevant circumstances), and 
d. which A cannot reasonably justify by reference to matters other than B's 
sexual orientation. 
4) For the purposes of paragraphs (1) and (3), the fact that one of the persons (whether 
or not B) is a civil partner while the other is married shall not be treated as a material 
difference in the relevant circumstances. 
 
4 – Goods Facilities and Services 
 
1) It is unlawful for a person (“A”) concerned with the provision to the public or a 
section of the public of goods, facilities or services to discriminate against a person 
(“B”) who seeks to obtain or to use those goods, facilities or services— 
a. by refusing to provide B with goods, facilities or services,  
b. by refusing to provide B with goods, facilities or services of a quality which 
is the same as or similar to the quality of goods, facilities or services that A 
normally provides to—  
i. the public, or  
ii. a section of the public to which B belongs,  
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c. by refusing to provide B with goods, facilities or services in a manner which 
is the same as or similar to that in which A normally provides goods, 
facilities or services to—  
i. the public, or  
ii. a section of the public to which B belongs, or  
d. by refusing to provide B with goods, facilities or services on terms which 
are the same as or similar to the terms on which A normally provides goods, 
facilities or services to—  
i. the public, or  
ii. a section of the public to which B belongs.  
2) Paragraph (1) applies, in particular, to—  
a. access to and use of a place which the public are permitted to enter,  
b. accommodation in a hotel, boarding house or similar establishment,  
c. facilities by way of banking or insurance or for grants, loans, credit or 
finance, . 
d. facilities for entertainment, recreation or refreshment,  
e. facilities for transport or travel, and  
f. the services of a profession or trade.  
3) (3) Paragraph (1) does not apply —  
a. in relation to the provision of goods, facilities or services by a person 
exercising a public function, or  
b. to discrimination in relation to the provision of goods, facilities or services, 
where such discrimination—  
i. is unlawful by virtue of another provision of these regulations or by 
virtue of a provision of the Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003(1) (“the 2003 Regulations”), or  
ii. would be unlawful by virtue of another provision of these 
Regulations or of the 2003 Regulations but for an express exception.  
4) (4) For the purposes of paragraph (1) it is immaterial whether or not a person 
charges for the provision of goods, facilities or services. 
 
B European Convention on Human Rights 
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
35 DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION:  A COMPARISON BETWEEN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND NEW ZEALAND 
  
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 9 – Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion 
1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, 
in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 14 – Prohibition on Discrimination 
 
1) The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
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